Pleading the Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases by Nock, George R.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1977 | Issue 1 Article 9
3-1-1977
Pleading the Statute of Limitations in Criminal
Cases
George R. Nock
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
George R. Nock, Pleading the Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases, 1977 BYU L. Rev. 75 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1977/iss1/9
Pleading the Statute of Limitations in Criminal 
Cases 
George R. Nock* 
Lawyers regard loopholes with mixed emotions. There is al- 
ways the temptation to cherish and defend pointless technicali- 
ties as amulets of the lawyer's magical arts. They are understand- 
ably revered by the legal wizard whose mastery over them permits 
the defeat of justice in the interests of a client's cause. Their 
defense, however, becomes more difficult as they blur the line 
between advocacy and pettifoggery. 
The technical requirements of pleading the statute of limita- 
tions in criminal cases afford some splendid opportunities to use 
the statute to overturn otherwise successful prosecutions which 
were not, in fact, barred by limitations. Whatever admiration 
may be excited by such adroit use of these pleading rules must 
give way to a realization that such results are offensive to a legal 
system that seeks to resolve disputes according to rules of law, 
rather than procedural sleight of hand. The purpose of this article 
is to identify the technical requirements for pleading the statute 
of limitations in criminal cases, distinguish those requirements 
that serve a valid purpose from those that do not, and provide an 
analytical framework for the construction of pleading rules that 
further, rather than retard, the purposes of the limitations stat- 
utes themselves. 
I. INTRODUCTORY ILLUSTRATION: In re Demillo 
A useful starting point for a discussion of pleading the stat- 
ute of limitations in criminal cases is the recent California Su- 
preme Court decision of In re Demillo, * a unanimous opinion of 
one of the nation's leading courts, which illustrates the basic 
issues in this area yet reaches a questionable result. Petitioner 
Demillo pleaded guilty to an information charging him with a 
f e l ~ n y , ~  which was subject to California's general three-year stat- 
* B.A., 1961, San Jose State University. J.D., 1966, Hastings College of Law; Asso- 
ciate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. The author gratefully acknowledges 
the valuable research assistance of Margaret Hein, member of the third-year class of the 
University of Puget Sound School of Law. 
1. 14 Cal. 3d 598, 535 P.2d 1181, 121 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1975). 
2. The felony charged was a violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West 1970) (lewd or 
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ute of  limitation^.^ Facing the prospect of deportation prompted 
by his felony conviction, Demillo filed in the California Supreme 
Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to overturn 
the conviction. The petition alleged merely that the offense to 
which he had pleaded guilty occurred more than three years prior 
to the filing of the information. The information itself was silent 
as to the time the offense was committed. Responding to the 
petition, the California Attorney General agreed that more than 
three years had elapsed between commission of the offense and 
filing of the information, but alleged that petitioner had been 
absent from the state during the critical period. Such absence 
from the state tolls the running of the statute of limitations.' 
Relying on the proposition that the "statute of limitations is juris- 
dictional in n a t ~ r e " ~  and "may therefore be raised at any time, 
before or after judgment,"' and the further proposition that 
"[aln accusatory pleading must allege facts showing that the 
prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations,"' the court 
held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the matter, issued 
the writ, and discharged the petitioner. Jurisdiction was deemed 
absent because the information was filed beyond the limitations 
period and failed to allege facts tolling the statute. 
There remained the problem of the Attorney General's offer 
to prove that the defendant was out of the state during the critical 
period. The court noted the existence of "some support for the 
proposition that if a criminal defendant fails to raise the statute 
of limitations defense a t  trial, the People should be permitted to 
cure the defect in collateral proceedings by offering new evidence 
on the issue of defendant's absence from the state? It concluded, 
however, that this was an inappropriate case for the exercise of 
the court's discretionary power to receive new evidence on habeas 
corpus, since it would be required to make factual determinations 
regarding petitioner's earlier where about^.^ 
The court's decision presents several difficulties. The refusal 
to consider the Attorney General's evidence is itself astonishing.1° 
lascivious acts upon the body of a child under 14). 
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1976). 
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 802 (West 1970). 
5. 14 Cal. 3d at 601, 535 P.2d at 1183, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 727. 
6. Id. (quoting People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, 613, 36 P.2d 378, 379 (1934)). 
7. Id. at 602, 535 P.2d at 1184, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (quoting People v. Crosby, 58 
Cal. 2d 713, 724, 375 P.2d 839, 846, 25 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1962)). 
8. Id. (citing 23 CALIF. L. REV. 525 (1935)). 
9. Id. at 603, 535 P.2d at 1184, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 728. 
10. Contrary to the court's implication, its common practice is to conduct evidentiary 
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But the decision to discharge Demillo is particularly disturbing 
if one goes beyond the face of the opinion. In his response to the 
petition, the Attorney General tendered affidavits of both prose- 
cutor and defense counsel in the trial court proceedings. These 
affidavits showed that both counsel were fully aware of the stat- 
ute of limitations problem, including the deficiency of the infor- 
mation in failing to allege compliance with the statute. The de- 
fense was also aware that the prosecution was prepared to present 
formidable evidence of facts tolling the statute. In light of this, 
defense counsel recommended the entry of a plea of guilty." By 
failing to mention these affidavits, the court avoided the necess- 
ity of considering the validity of a judgment imposed following 
entry of a plea of guilty to an accusatory pleading known by the 
defendant to be defective. 
The aspect of the decision that is most noteworthy, however, 
and that demands the most careful analysis, is the basic proposi- 
hearings when they are necessary. Evidentiary hearings are necessary when a habeas 
corpus petitioner alleges facts which, if true, entitle him to relief, and which are denied 
by respondent. In such a case, the petitioner can prevail only if he is given an opportunity 
to prove his allegations. The California Supreme Court customarily gives him such an 
opportunity by appointing a referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., In re 
Rose, 62 Cal. 2d 384, 398 P.2d 428, 42 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1965); In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 
387 P.2d 6,35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1963); Granucci, Review of Criminal Convictions by Habeas 
Corpus in California, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 189, 192 (1963). The refusal of the court to hold 
such a hearing in Demillo seems to be based on the assumption that the burden of proof 
in that case lay on respondent, and that there is some justification for denying respondent 
the opportunity to discharge that burden. The fact that the California Supreme Court 
frequently uses reference hearings to resolve factual disputes negates any such apparent 
justification. Moreover, the court fails to consider the fundamental rule that the burden 
is on a habeas corpus petitioner to prove any disputed factual allegations necessary to the 
establishment of his right to relief, In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 372 P.2d 304, 306, 22 
Cal. Rptr. 472, 474 (1962), and thus does not explain why the burden should be deemed 
in this case to shift to respondent. 
The court's refusal to allow respondent to present evidence could have interesting 
collateral consequences. The professed reason for this refusal is the court's handicapped 
status in the role of fact finder. In California, habeas corpus petitions may be brought, as 
original matters, not only in the supreme court, but in the courts of appeal and superior 
courts. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§  4,4(b), 5; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1475 (West 1970); Granucci, 
supra at 192. Since superior courts are well-equipped to take evidence and resolve factual 
disputes, the implication of the opinion is that had Demillo filed his petition in the 
appropriate superior court an evidentiary hearing would have ensued, with respondent 
being permitted to prove facts that defeat the petition. By going directly to the state 
supreme court, Demillo was able to avoid the establishment of embarrassing facts. The 
court is thus, however unwittingly, encouraging habeas corpus petitioners to bypass the 
superior court and file directly in the supreme court, in the hope that the latter will take 
the petition's allegations a t  face value, require respondent to disprove them, and use its 
status as a reviewing court as an excuse to refuse to hear respondent's evidence. 
11. Return to Order to Show Cause, In re Demillo, Cal. Sup. Ct. 11Crim. Nos. 18317, 
18396, Exhibits 0 ,  P. 
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tion that a conviction may be vacated on collateral attack on the 
sole ground that the trial court pleadings failed to establish com- 
pliance with the statute of limitations-even though the prosecu- 
tion may not in fact have been barred by limitations. Even those 
inured to the point of numbness to rules of criminal procedure 
that make truth irrelevant can hardly fail to be disturbed by one 
consequence of the opinion-the encouragement of what may be 
called "low-profile" pleading. For example, if a defendant in a 
criminal case knows that his prosecution is not in fact barred by 
limitations, but is confronted with an indictment or information 
that fails to negate prescription, his best course of conduct is 
clear: he should fail to raise the matter of time limitations at trial, 
when the prosecution would have the opportunity to remedy the 
pleading defect, and reserve the issue for collateral attack, in 
which he will succeed merely by pointing out the defect in the 
accusatory pleading. 
This absurd result arises from application of two commonly 
accepted propositions: that the statute of limitations in criminal 
cases is "jurisdictional" in nature, and that an accusatory plead- 
ing must allege facts showing compliance with the statute? Both 
of these propositions are debatable, but analysis will show that 
even if they are accepted, they do not require the result reached 
in Demillo. A necessary step in a comprehensive analysis of the 
problems posed by this case is a consideration of the validity of 
these two underlying propositions. Such a consideration begins 
with an examination of the nature, origin, and purposes of crimi- 
nal statutes of limitations and the policies underlying technical 
pleading rules. 
Time limitations on the prosecution of criminal cases are 
entirely statutory. The common law accepted the doctrine that 
no lapse of time bars the king (nullum tempus occurrit regi),13 a 
doctrine that still largely prevails in England.14 Limitations stat- 
utes originated in civil law jurisdictions and were given wide- 
12. See, People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934) (noted in 23 CALIF. L. 
REV. 525 (1935), 33 MICH. L. REV. 805 (1935), 8 S. CAL. L. REV. 155 (1935), and 10 WASH. 
L. REV. 109 (1935)); Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 P.2d 1013 (1958); 
State v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080 (1921). 
13. 2 J .  STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 1-2 (1883). 
14. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U .  PA. L. REV. 630 (1954). 
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spread adoption in America during the colonial era, for reasons 
that remain ob~cure.~Wurrently, some form of general criminal 
statute of limitations is found in all but three American jurisdic- 
tions,16 although five others have no limitations for felonies.17 
Prescriptive periods in the United States vary from one to 
twenty years, the most common periods being three, five, or six 
years for felonies and one or two years for  misdemeanor^.^^ All 
jurisdictions but one place no time limitations on murder prose- 
cutions,lg and many exempt various other serious felonies as 
well? Longer prescriptive periods are commonly provided for cer- 
tain offenses not likely to be discovered during a short period.2' 
It is normally provided, either by a separate statuteZ2 or by 
the limitations statute itself,23 that the statute is tolled during 
any period in which defendant is absent from the state2' or is a 
fugitive from justice.25 The wording of these statutes takes one of 
two general forms. It provides either that a prosecution "must" 
or "shall" be commenced within the designated periodZ6 or that 
"[nlo person shall be tried, prosecuted or punished" for any 
offense unless prosecution is commenced within the period.27 
Commencement of prosecution, for purposes of tolling the stat- 
ute, is by the return of an indictment, in jurisdictions where 
criminal prosecutions must ordinarily be begun by i n d i ~ t m e n t , ~ ~  
or by the filing of a complaint or information, in other jurisdic- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Some statutes provide that the statute is tolled during the 
pendency of an indictment or information, even though such ac- 
cusatory pleading is ultimately found to be invalid,30 while others 
15. Id. at  631-32 & nn. 6-7. 
16. Ohio, South Carolina, and Wyoming. 
17. Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
18. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 652-53 (1954). 
19. Id. New Mexico provides a 10-year limitation for any capital or first-degree fe- 
lony. N.M. STAT. ANN. Q 40A-1-8 (1972). 
20. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 652-53 (1954). 
21. Id. 
22. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE Q 802 (West 1970). 
23. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 63 (West 1972). 
24. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. 8 752.5 (West 1950); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 153 (West 
1969). 
25. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. Q 2A:159-2 (West 1971). 
26. E.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 4 30.10 (McKinney 1971). 
27. Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 541.190 (Vernon 1953). 
28. E.g., 18 U.S.C. 8 3282 (1970). 
29. E.g., KAN. STAT. Q 21-3106(5) (1974). 
30. E.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW Q 30.10(4)(b) (McKinney 1971). 
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have no such pro~is ion.~~ 
The suggested purposes of criminal limitations statutes are 
manifold. Unfortunately, they are also entirely speculative. In 
view of the almost total absence of legislative history," it is im- 
possible to determine what actually motivated enactment of 
these statutes. We are thus forced to identify the purposes that 
the statutes in fact serve, and presume a legislative intent to serve 
them. Among the suggested purposes are to protect a defendant 
from having to defend when proofs of innocence have grown stale, 
to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be ob- 
tained, to notify the defendant that he can cease preserving 
proofs of his innocence, to discourage the public degradation at- 
tendant upon the publication of forgotten crimes, to exact vigi- 
lance and diligence from prosecutors and police, and to recognize 
that an absence of detectable recent criminal activity on the part 
of an individual tends to render pointless his prosecution and 
punishment for an ancient offense.33 In connection with the last 
point, it may be suggested that the legislature has determined 
that prosecution after a certain date represents a misallocation of 
social resources and that the statute serves the function of pre- 
venting a prosecutor (perhaps responding to public pressure) 
from causing such misallocation. Basically, the purposes behind 
criminal limitations statutes fall into two general categories: the 
protection of the personal interests of the accused, and the protec- 
tion of the interests of society by ensuring that social resources 
are not squandered on pointless punitive efforts. 
It is axiomatic that pleading rules have two primary func- 
tions: (1) to further efficient and expeditious resolution of legal 
disputes, and (2) to further the public policies underlying the 
substantive and procedural legal principles that  are applied 
through pleadings. Thus, judicial efforts to formulate rules for the 
pleading of limitations ought to be made with a view to providing 
rules that have two aims: to discover at the earliest possible time 
and within the least expenditure of judicial effort those prosecu- 
31. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE $ 5  800-02 (West 1970). 
32. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U .  PA. L. REV. 630, 632 (1954). 
33. See, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,323-25 (1971); F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 210-11 (8th ed. 1880); Note, The Statute of Limitations in Crimi- 
nal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U .  PA. L. REV. 630, 632-34 (1954). 
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tions that are time-barred, and to ensure that the policies behind 
limitations legislation are carried out. The decisions that have 
shaped limitations-pleading rules have usually considered one 
aim or the other; seldom have the courts sought to achieve both. 
That fact, together with a persistent want of analytical depth on 
the part of judges seeking to formulate workable rules, accounts 
for the present, rather mystifying state of the law. 
A. Issues in Pleading the Statute of Limitations 
The Demillo case raises four major issues with respect to the 
requirements of pleading the statute of limitations in criminal 
cases: (1) Must a valid accusatory pleading allege facts showing 
that the prosecution is not barred by limitations? (2) If so, should 
a defendant's failure to point out the defect in the accusatory 
pleading at  the trial court level amount to a waiver of his right 
to rely on the statute of limitations? (3) Should a plea of guilty 
to a defective accusatory pleading amount to a waiver of a limita- 
tions defense? (4) May a conviction be set aside on collateral 
attack upon a showing that the accusatory pleading failed to 
negative prescription, without showing that the prosecution was 
in fact time-barred? 
For the most part, the resolution of these issues is not clearly 
determined by statute34 but has been left to the courts. Since time 
limitations are entirely statutory, and it is not suggested that an 
American jurisdiction is under a constitutional obligation to im- 
pose any particular period of criminal pre~cription,~~ resolution of 
limitations-pleading issues must be undertaken in the spirit of 
furthering legislative intent. As the courts have dealt with these 
issues, however, they have often reached results that have failed 
to fulfill the purposes behind both pleading rules and limitations 
statutes. 
34. A few jurisdictions have statutorily provided that an indictment or information 
is insufficient unless it shows that the prosecution is not barred by limitations. See, e.g., 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.21(6) (Vernon 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 
10.37.050(5) (1961). Louisiana, on the other hand, expressly provides that the state shall 
not be required to allege facts showing that the time limitation has not expired, and that 
the issue of limitations may be raised at any time, but only once, and is to be tried by 
the court alone. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 577 (West 1967). An Indiana statute 
provides that a valid plea of guilty may be entered to a charge even if the limitations 
period has expired. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-2(4)(f) (Bums Supp. 1976) (effective July 1, 
1977). 
35. The due process clause of the fifth amendment, and presumably that of the 
fourteenth as well, may provide a constitutional barrier against a prosecution unreason- 
ably delayed to the prejudice of the accused. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
324-25 (1971). 
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B. Judicial Resolution of the Issues 
1. Must a valid pleading affirmatively demonstrate compliance 
with the statute of limitations? 
a. Majority rule. A rather substantial majority of the courts 
have held that a valid accusatory pleading must allege facts nega- 
tiving pres~r ip t ion .~~ The majority position is generally rested 
upon two propositions: that the statute of limitations should be 
liberally interpreted in favor of the accused, and that the statute 
constitutes a substantive bar to prosecution, rather than a mere 
statute of repose.37 The principle of liberal construction seems to 
be derived from Wharton's seminal treatment of the subject: 
We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in 
applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construc- 
tion that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. 
The two classes of statutes . . . are essentially different. In civil 
suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial 
arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of 
the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in 
favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there 
is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions 
of construction are to be made. But it is otherwise when a stat- 
ute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the 
grantor, surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute, and 
declaring the offence to be no longer the subject of prosecution. 
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudg- 
ingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain 
time oblivion shall be cast over the offence, that the offender 
shall be a t  liberty to return to his country, and resume his im- 
munities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to 
preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt 
are blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are not 
to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only 
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of 
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute 
is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact 
that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has 
36. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 45 Del. 16, 69 A.2d 299 (1949); Robinson v. State, 20 
Fla. 804 (1884); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 258 Ky. 446, 80 S.W.2d 540 (1935); People 
v. Gregory, 30 Mich. 371 (1874). See cases cited in note 12, supra, and Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 
922 (1973). 
37. Both propositions are forcefully maintained in Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 
739 (10th Cir. 1964). 
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assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys 
proofs of 
Wharton's propositions are scarcely self-evident. We can 
allow that the terms of a grant should ordinarily be construed 
strictly against the grantor. But it does not follow that the legisla- 
ture, in limiting the time in which wrongs to the state may be 
judicially redressed, should be regarded in the same light as a 
rapacious subdivider whose deed to a naive homeowner must be 
scrutinized as carefully as a contract of adhesion. Conversely, 
characterization of a statute of limitations as an act of "grace" 
seems accurate if that word is given its theological definition of 
unmerited favor. But to assume that the dispensation of grace 
endues the legislature with the divine quality of ungrudging gen- 
erosity is to assume a bit too much. It seems entirely within the 
legislative province to approach limitations in a rather niggardly 
manner. Limitations are in derogation of the common law. They 
result in extinction of a valid public cause of action upon the 
expiration of an arbitrarily selected time period, without regard 
to whether such extinction furthers or retards justice in any indi- 
vidual case. They necessarily result in a number of guilty persons 
escaping punishment altogether, without necessarily sparing any 
innocent persons punishment. The numerous exceptions to gen- 
eral limitations suggest a legislative wariness of the very principle 
of limitation. The enactment of limitations statutes demonstrates 
a legislative judgment that they do more good than harm, but 
hardly shows an uncritical legislative embrace of the idea of bar- 
ring prosecutions by time. 
More supportive of the majority view, although no more self- 
evident from the language of the typical statute, is the proposi- 
tion that the statute is intended to be a substantive bar to prose- 
cution, rather than a mere statute of repose. If the statute is 
viewed as creating a mere technical defense, which a defendant 
will lose if he lacks the wit to raise it, then no apparent purpose 
would be served by requiring the prosecution to plead compliance 
with the statute. But if the legislature intended to create an abso- 
lute bar to a late prosecution, i t  could be plausibly maintained 
that the prosecutor has the duty of demonstrating, in his initial 
pleading, that the prosecution may be validly begun. The diffi- 
culty lies in inferring a legislative intent to create a substantive 
bar to prosecution. 
38. F. WHARTON, supra note 33, at 209-10. 
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A statute employing the typical wording, to the effect that a 
prosecution must be commenced within a designated period, says 
little on its face about whether the legislature intended to pre- 
clude the prosecution altogether or merely to give the accused a 
special defense.39 But where the statute expressly states that no 
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished unless the prosecu- 
tion is commenced within a certain period,40 a legislative intent 
that there be no prosecution at all is strongly suggested. Only one 
case, however, has been found that rests its conclusion that the 
legislature intended a substantive bar, even in part, upon the fact 
that the relevant statute adopted the latter ~ord ing .~ '  
b. Minority rule. The minority cases, holding that an accu- 
satory pleading need not negate prescription, reach their conclu- 
sion either without analysisd2 or on the theory that limitations are 
a matter of defense, to be pleaded by the accused." A related 
theory is that when limitations periods are imposed by a statute 
independent of the one defining the crime, they are to be regarded 
in the same light as any other exceptions imposed by independent 
statute; their inapplicability therefore need not be alleged in the 
ind i~ t rnent .~~  The minority view flows naturally, if not inelucta- 
bly, from a perception of the statute as providing a defense, 
rather than a bar, to prosecution. 
c. Difficulties inherent in the setting in which the issue 
commonly arises. Recognition of a clean difference between ma- 
jority and minority rules is impaired by the circumstance under 
which the pleading issue commonly arises. In a typical case, the 
accusation will allege the date of the commission of the offense45 
and will show on its face that the time between that date and 
commencement of the prosecution is longer than the limitations 
period. The question then arises whether the accusation must 
- 
39. By contrast, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, B 8 (1976) expressly refers to limitations 
as a "defense." 
40. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 541.200 (Vernon 1953); NEB. REV. STAT. 4 29-110 (1975); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 4 40A-1-8 (1953); 18 U.S.C. 4 3282 (1970). 
41. Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964). 
42. See, e.g., State v. Harvey, 169 Ark. 1074, 277 S.W. 869 (1925). 
43. See Thompson v. State, 54 Miss. 740 (1877). 
44. See United States v. Cook, 84 U S .  168,173-74 (1872); People v. Kohut, 30 N.Y.2d 
183, 187, 282 N.E.2d 312, 314-15, 331 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (1972). 
45. Although a number of statutes provide that an allegation as to the time of the 
commission of the crime may be omitted from the accusatory pleading unless time is of 
the essence of the offense charged, there is no good reason not to make an allegation of 
time, and prosecutors ordinarily do so. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15 4 237 (1958); CAL. PENAL 
CODE 4 955 (West 1970). See 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations 4 124 (1944). 
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allege facts showing that the statute of limitations was tolled.46 
It is on this issue that most of the decisions have divided, the 
majority answering the question in the affirmative and the minor- 
ity in the negative.47 
To treat the issue as separate from that of whether an accusa- 
tory pleading must negative prescription is a trompe l'oeil. If a 
valid accusatory pleading must show that the prosecution is not 
time-barred, then it must in all cases show the date of commis- 
sion of the offense and the date of prosecution and allege 
limitations-tolling facts if the time between the two dates is 
longer than the prescriptive period. A pleading silent as to the 
time the offense was committed would be insufficient on its face. 
Conversely, if an accusatory pleading is not required as a matter 
of course to negative prescription, it should not have to allege 
tolling facts merely because the pleading suggests that prosecu- 
tion may be barred by lapse of time. The mere fact that an indict- 
ment or information gratuitously alleges the date of commission 
of the offense should make no difference to the proper resolution 
of the ultimate question of how the accusatory pleading must 
address the problem of limitations. 
It is theoretically possible to argue that an accusatory plead- 
ing need not ordinarily negative prescription but must do so when 
prescription is suggested by juxtaposition of dates. No court ap- 
pears to have made such an argument. But the sight of a pleading 
that shows that the offense charged was of ancient commission 
invites the thoughtless conclusion that the pleading is bad unless 
it gives facts that would rescue the prosecution from the bar of 
the statute. Some of the confusion exhibited by the courts in the 
pleading-limitations area may be explicable by the prevalence of 
such pleadings. 
d. The preferred rule. The primary consequence of a rule 
requiring an accusatory pleading to set forth factual allegations 
negating the bar of the statute is that the limitations issue may 
be raised on the part of the accused by demurrer, motion to 
quash, or other attack on the facial sufficiency of the pleadingsd8 
46. Tolling of the statute is usually shown by demonstrating the accused's absence 
from or nonresidence in the jurisdiction, or his fugutive status during the critical period, 
or by showing that a prior accusatory pleading charging the same offense had been filed 
and set aside. See notes 24-25 and 30-31 and accompanying text supra. 
47. Representative of the majority view are: People v. Swinney, 46 Cal. App. 3d 332, 
120 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1975); People v. Munoz, 23 Ill. App. 3d 306, 319 N.E.2d 98 (1974). 
Minority cases include: State v. Rosen, 52 N.J. Super. 210, 145 A.2d 158 (1958); People 
v. Kohut, 30 N.Y.2d 183, 282 N.E.2d 312, 331 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1972). 
48. See, e.g., Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 P.2d 1013 (1958). 
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This consequence is of considerable importance in determining 
whether accusatory pleadings should be required to negate pre- 
scription, in light of the posited dual purpose of pleading rules. 
A rule that permits and encourages the resolution of crucial issues 
prior to trial and on the basis of the pleadings obviously furthers 
the first objective of efficient and expeditious resolution of legal 
disputes. It is thus desirable to require an accusatory pleading to 
show that the action is not barred by limitations and permit it 
to be stricken if it does not. Where the prosecution is in fact 
barred by limitations, a determination of that issue on the plead- 
ings saves a pointless trial. 
The other purpose of a pleading rule is to further the policies 
underlying the statute of limitations. If one of those policies is to 
prevent prosecutions that are in fact barred by time, its corollary 
is to permit prosecutions that are in fact not barred by time. If 
local practice mandates outright dismissal of an accusatory 
pleading subject to facial attack, then a rule that rendered vul- 
nerable to such attack a pleading that failed affirmatively to 
demonstrate timeliness of prosecution would result in the abor- 
tion of some valid prosecutions. The leading case for the minority 
view, United States v. based its decision in part on fear 
of this result. But where the accusation may be amended, either 
as a matter of right or in the sound discretion of the trial court,50 
this objection disappears. 
In the absence of an express provision governing the pleading 
of limitations, and in the absence of language to the effect that 
no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished after expiration 
of the limitations period, statutory language gives no clues as to 
whether the legislature intended the statute of limitations to be 
a matter of defense or a substantive bar to prosecution. Either 
position seems reasonable. If a court assumes a legislative intent 
to create a substantive bar, then all considerations point toward 
a rule requiring the pleading of nonprescription-unless local 
practice precludes the amendment of the accusatory pleading to 
49. 84 U.S. 168, 179-80 (1872). The Court noted that to sustain a demurrer on grounds 
of failure to allege timeliness would deprive the prosecutor of his right to prove that 
defendant had fled the jurisdiction or was otherwise within the exception to the statute. 
50. See, e.g., People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713,375 P.2d 839,25 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1962); 
Herman v. State, 247 Ind. 7, 210 N.E.2d 249 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966); 
Wilkins v. State, 16 Md. App. 587, 300 A.2d 411 (Ct. Spec. App.), aff'd, 270 Md. 62, 310 
A.2d 39 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 992 (1974). For a collection of decisions on the 
question of amendability in the statute of limitations context, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 
1297 (1967). 
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allege facts showing that the prosecution is not barred by time. 
But even if it is assumed that the legislature intended to make 
limitations a mere matter of defense, it is still preferable to re- 
quire the accusatory pleading to show timeliness (assuming the 
amendability under local practice of defective pleadings). A rule 
that merely establishes the demurrability of an accusation that 
does not negative prescription still requires the matter to be 
raised by the defense, and is thus consistent with a legislative 
recognition of limitations as a matter of defense. And its efficacy 
in weeding out prosecutions instituted without an appreciation of 
their untimeliness serves a plainly worthwhile purpose. It is thus 
clearly the better view that the prosecution must allege facts 
showing that the action is not time-barred. 
2. Should a defendant's failure to point out deficiencies in  the 
pleadings at the trial court level waive his right to rely on the 
statute of limitations? 
There is a considerable difference between the contention 
that an accusatory pleading is subject to facial attack at the trial 
court level for want of an allegation of nonprescription, and the 
assertion that the issue may be raised for the first time on direct 
or collateral attack. The policy considerations applicable at these 
stages of the proceedings are altogether different from those 
applicable at trial. The opportunity to avoid a useless trial has 
already fled, and the first purpose of a pleading rule requiring an 
allegation of timeliness-expeditious resolution of a limitations 
dispute-has not been furthered. The only policy basis for allow- 
ing a tardy raising of the issue of limitations would have to be 
found in the purposes underlying the limitations statute itself. 
It will be recalled that these purposes are of two kinds-to 
protect defendant from prosecution and punishment, and to pro- 
tect society by preventing resources from being misallocated to a 
prosecution that the legislature deems without point. After the 
trial is over, it is too late to save either the accused or the state 
the time, money, and energy expended in a trial. The only pur- 
pose of permitting the statute of limitations to be belatedly raised 
would be to prevent the imposition or continuation of punish- 
ment. If the legislature has conclusively presumed that even a 
guilty person is not in need of punishment after expiration of the 
limitations period,ll then the legislative purpose of protecting an 
51. Such a conclusive presumption would ill befit a reasonable legislature. Limita- 
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accused would be served by allowing the issue of limitations to 
be raised for the first time following trial." But a valid state 
interest might also be served by such allowance. Punishment 
itself drains state resources, at least to the extent that it requires 
incarcerating a convict or supervising a probationer. A colorable 
argument could thus be made for judicial sufferance of belatedly 
raised limitations claims.53 
The few cases dealing with the question have largely ignored 
policy considerations and proceeded upon a theory of 
"j~risdiction."~~ The essence of this theory is that the statute of 
limitations is "jurisdictional" in the sense that the running of the 
statute operates to deprive the court of the power to prosecute or 
punish the accused.55 The theory is seemingly intended as a re- 
statement of the view that the legislature intended the statute as 
a bar to both prosecution and punishment. If one perceives a 
legislative intent that there be no punishment after the running 
of the statute, even though prosecution has already occurred, it 
follows that a court is without power to impose punishment. The 
legislative policy of preventing such punishment is furthered by 
allowing this lack of power to be brought to judicial attention at  
tions statutes uniformly provide for exceptions, such as absence from the jurisdiction, 
which can indefinitely lengthen the limitations period. Furthermore, the statutes govern 
only the time in which the prosecution must be commenced, not the time in which trial 
must be had or punishment imposed. It is possible for trial to be legitimately delayed for 
six years, and perhaps much longer, following the filing of the accusatory pleading, see 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and for the imposition of punishment to be delayed 
even longer by appellant's enlargement during the appellate process. In a given case, 
therefore, periods vastly longer than that designated in a limitations statute may elapse 
between commission of the offense and imposition of punishment without offending the 
statute. 
52. There is no reason to assume, however, that the legislature would have enacted a 
limitations statute whose sole purpose was the prevention of punishment, as opposed to 
prosecution. 
53. Jurisdictions differ widely in permitting defendant to raise claims of any sort on 
direct or collateral attack when such claims could have been raised a t  trial. To recognize 
limitations issues as exceptions to a jurisdiction's general rule with respect to timeliness 
of defenses could be justified only for clear and compelling reasons. 
54. E.g., Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964); In re Demillo, 14 
Cal. 3d 598, 535 P.2d 1181, 121 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1975); People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, 36 
P.2d 378 (1934). 
55. The jurisdictional theory is further developed in People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 
375 P.2d 839, 25 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1962); Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 
P.2d 1013 (1958); State v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080 (1921). The Steensland 
case does not make clear whether appellant explicitly raised the limitations defense at  
trial, although it  does state that he failed to demur to the information. Since it  reverses a 
conviction on limitations grounds despite the failure to interpose a proper demurrer, the 
case may be authority for the proposition that limitations can be raised initially on direct 
attack. 
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any time before the punishment has been fully administered. 
Those courts that assert that the statute of limitations is 
"jurisdictional" may thus reach a sound result in certain cases, 
but use of the term impedes full consideration of questions of 
policy and presumed legislative intent. Review of a criminal con- 
viction on direct attack is limited almost entirely to the face of 
the record on appeal." For that reason, the trial court's actual 
jurisdiction may be impossible for an appellate court to deter- 
mine. If compliance with the statute of limitations is essential to 
the trial court's jurisdiction, but no evidence bearing on limita- 
tions is given, the most that can be said is that the evidence fails 
to establish the trial court's jurisdiction. The appellate court has 
no acceptable choice in such circumstances but to reverse and 
remand for a new trial a t  which the jurisdictional question can 
be litigated. At the same time, if the facts proved at trial clearly 
establish or negate jurisdiction, the appellate court can deter- 
mine whether there was in fact jurisdiction and base its ruling on 
that determination?' Under either of these circumstances, the 
pleadings are not clearly relevant to the question of jurisdiction. 
Further, if the trial court erroneously overruled a demurrer to an 
accusatory pleading that failed to negative prescription, but the 
prosecutor nonetheless proved facts showing compliance with the 
statute of limitations, it is difficult to see how the defect in the 
pleading, or the trial court's failure to recognize that defect, could 
justify reversal of the conviction. 
3. Should a guilty plea to a defective pleading waive the 
defendant's statute of limitations defense? 
The state of the pleadings becomes important when the de- 
fendant has pleaded guilty and the record is therefore barren of 
evidence bearing on the question of the running of the statute of 
limitations. If the accusatory pleading properly alleges facts 
showing that the prosecution is not barred by limitations, then 
the defendant's plea of guilty will be deemed an admission of 
those facts. This admission will fill the evidentiary void with 
56. See, e.g., Brown v. Sutton, 158 Miss. 78, 121 So. 835 (1929); Norwegian Plow Co. 
v. Bollman, 47 Neb. 186, 66 N.W. 292 (1896). 
57. Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964), is illustrative. On the basis 
of agreed facts, the court of appeals determined as a matter of law that the prosecution 
violated the statute of limitations. It accordingly reversed the conviction and directed the 
dismissal of the prosecution for want of jurisdiction, even though defendant raised the 
limitations issue for the first time on appeal. 
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respect to limitations facts in the same way that it relieves the 
prosecutor of the necessity of proving the commission of the of- 
fense charged. The difficult question arises when the defendant, 
without in any way raising the limitations issue, pleads guilty to 
an indictment or information that fails to negative prescription 
and seeks reversal on the basis of the failure of the accusatory 
pleading to establish jurisdiction in the trial court. 
Assuming that an appeal from a conviction based on such a 
guilty plea will lie,58 it is inescapable that the record fails to 
demonstrate the continuing power of the trial court to prosecute 
or punish for the offense charged. Whether this failure requires 
reversal of an otherwise valid judgment of conviction should be 
decided on the basis of the policy considerations alluded to ear- 
lier. To permit the defendant to raise the issue for the first time 
on appeal would violate any general policy encouraging the 
timely presentation of claims and would particularly thwart ful- 
fillment of the pleading rule function of affording quick resolution 
of limitations issues. Therefore, a defendant's failure to raise the 
limitations issue at trial should work a forfeiture of any right to 
assert his personal interests to invoke a technical statute in order 
to escape punishment. 
But there remains the state's independent interest in avoid- 
ing the costly imposition of punishment serving no useful pur- 
pose. A statutory construction ascribing to the legislature an in- 
tent absolutely to bar imposition of punishment in cases untimely 
prosecuted would justify permitting a defendant to raise the issue 
of timeliness for the first time on appeal. In the case of an appeal 
from a conviction based on a guilty plea to an indictment or 
information that does not show timeliness, the issue of whether 
the prosecution is time-barred cannot be fully determined on 
appeal. The appellate court is thus justified in reversing the con- 
viction and remanding for further proceedings in which the limi- 
tations issue can be factually resolved. 
If the limitations issue is seen as merely a defense, there is 
no policy consideration underlying the statute of limitationss 
that requires the conclusion that the entry of a plea of guilty 
necessarily amounts to a waiver of that defense. Illustrative is 
State v. Tupa?O Appellant had been charged with a crime subject 
58. Some states restrict the appealability of convictions based on guilty pleas. See, 
e .g. ,  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West 1970); People v. Ribero, 4 Cal. 3d 55, 480 P.2d 308, 
92 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1971). 
59. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. 
60. 194 Minn. 488, 260 N.W. 875 (1935). 
751 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 91 
to limitations. The information showed that the crime had been 
committed nine years before, the prescriptive period was three 
years, and the information did not allege facts showing appel- 
lant's absence from the jurisdiction. Appellant's demurrer to the 
information on the ground that it failed to negate prescription 
was overruled and a guilty plea was entered. On appeal, the Min- 
nesota Supreme Court, adopting the majority rule requiring that 
the accusatory pleading show that the prosecution is not barred 
by time, reversed." Defendant's timely assertion of the limita- 
tions defense was held to preclude a finding oT waiver of the 
defense by entry of a guilty plea. The soundness of this result 
depends on the question of whether a guilty plea should be 
deemed a waiver of all defenses.82 The result in Tupa has the 
salutary effect of permitting a defendant to preserve his limita- 
tions defense without the necessity of going through a trial on the 
merits-which would be a pointless exercise if his only defense is 
that of limitations. 
But whether defenses in general, or certain defenses in par- 
ticular, should be deemed preserved for appellate review by 
timely trial court assertion, notwithstanding entry of a guilty 
plea, is a matter for resolution according to local practice. Policy 
considerations peculiar to limitations-pleading issues focus on 
whether the defendant has raised the issue of limitations a t  or 
before trial and, if not, whether any fundamental policy of the 
statute requires that the defendant be allowed to do so at a later 
stage. These considerations do not speak directly to the question 
of whether a plea of guilty per se should be deemed a waiver of a 
right to rely on the statute of limitations. 
4. Should a collateral attack be allowed on a pleading's failure 
to negative limitations without also showing that the prosecution 
was in fact barred? 
The final and most difficult question raised by Demillo is 
- 
61. In addition to reversing the conviction, the court ordered appellant discharged 
from custody. Id. at 497, 260 N.W. at 879. This order is peculiar in that the prosecution 
might have been able to amend the information to allege facts showing that appellant was 
within an exception to the limitations statute. If the court meant to preclude any such 
amendment, the result would be absurd, since it would treat the failure of the information 
to negate prescription as conclusive proof of prescription. 
62. It is generally held that a valid plea of guilty is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional 
defenses. See, e.g., Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 
761 (1937); Brisson v. Warden of Conn. State Prison, 25 Conn. Supp. 202, 200 A.2d 250 
(Super. Ct. 1964). Thus the issue would ordinarily be determined by whether the limita- 
tions defense is properly considered jurisdictional. 
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whether a conviction may be set aside on collateral attack on the 
sole ground that the accusatory pleading failed to allege facts 
negating prescription without any consideration of whether the 
prosecution was in fact barred by limitations. The California 
court's affirmative answer to this question demands close scru- 
tiny. 
Acceptance of the arguable propositions that the statute of 
limitations is jurisdictional and that its compliance must be al- 
leged in the accusatory pleading does not establish the validity 
of the Demillo result. It establishes only that the jurisdiction of 
the trial court, and hence the validity of the conviction, is subject 
to question. When the question is raised on direct attack, the 
reviewing court's inability to resolve it definitively justifies a re- 
versal of the conviction and a remand for the purpose of deter- 
mining the jurisdictional facts. 
When the issue is raised on collateral attack, however, quite 
different considerations apply. Collateral attack is not limited to 
the face of the record.63 Thus an evidentiary hearing in a habeas 
corpus proceeding could be used to determine whether the statute 
of limitations had in fact run. The relevant factual questions are 
whether the time between the commission of the charged offense 
and the commencement of the prosecution was longer than the 
limitations period and, if so, whether the defendant was absent 
from the state during the interim for a period sufficient to have 
tolled the statute. These questions could be resolved in a habeas 
corpus proceeding, with the defendant petitioner carrying the 
burden of proof.64 
Assuming, then, the desirability of an evidentiary hearing in 
conjunction with a collateral attack, what justification would 
lead a court to take the Demillo approach and deny such a factual 
inquiry? There is authority for the proposition that a judgment 
of conviction entered on a plea of guilty to an accusation that does 
not charge a crime is void and may be attacked collaterally." If 
that proposition is accepted, the next question is whether an 
accusation that fails to allege facts negativing prescription fails 
63. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Granucci, supra note 10, at 196. There 
is some indication that at the time of People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934), 
the scope of collateral attack was limited under California procedure to the face of the 
record. Granucci, supra note 10, at 195. This may account for the failure of the McGee 
court to consider the issue of whether the statute of limitations had in fact run in that 
case, since that issue could not have been conclusively resolved from the record. 
64. See, e.g., In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962). 
65. See L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE F OM ARREST TO APPEAL 205 & n.36 (1947). 
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to charge a crime. If it sets forth the elements of an offense known 
to the law, an accusatory pleading manifestly does charge a 
crime: it identifies the crime, gives defendant notice of the 
charges against him, and provides a basis for ascertaining an 
authorized punishment for the offense. But if the statute of limi- 
tations is viewed as creating a substantive bar to prosecution, 
such an accusation fails to allege a currently prosecutable crime. 
Even so, this defect probably should not render a consequential 
judgment utterly void. 
In states that accept the broad proposition that failure of an 
accusation to "charge a crime" voids a conviction entered upon 
a plea of guilty to that accusation, a colorable argument could be 
made that an accusation that does not negative prescription does 
not "charge a crime" and, therefore, that a conviction based 
thereon is void. To throw out a conviction on collateral attack 
on the sole ground of the want of such an allegation would not 
promote any of the policies underlying the statutes of limitations. 
While it might have a certain logical consistency, such an ap- 
proach would plainly exalt form over substance. However, no 
such state has ever said that a court is utterly without jurisdiction 
to render a valid judgment simply because the accusatory plead- 
ing does not show that the prosecution was timely brought. 
Other states, such as California, do not follow the rule that 
failure of the accusation to charge a crime renders void a convic- 
tion entered on a plea of guilty? Thus, they are logically pre- 
cluded from asserting the argument that an accusation "failing 
to charge a crime" because it does not negate prescription de- 
prives the court of jurisdiction and consequently voids the convic- 
tion. Further, California has held that a defendant may enter a 
valid plea of guilty to a crime that is neither charged in the 
66. The California rule has been stated as follows: 
The scope of inquiry upon habeas corpus into the sufficiency of an indictment 
or information is limited, for, although the petitioner may be discharged if the 
pleading totally fails to charge an offense known to the law, if there is attempted 
to be stated an offense of a kind of which the court assuming to proceed has 
jurisdiction, the question whether the facts charged are sufficient to constitute 
an offense of the kind will not be examined into. 
In re Jingles, 27 Cal. 2d 496, 499, 165 P.2d 12, 14-15 (1946). 
The California court has also stated that, while the sufficiency of a complaint in an 
inferior court may be considered on habeas corpus, an indictment or information filed in 
a court of general jurisdiction will not, the jurisdiction of such a court being presumed. 
Ex parte Greenhall, 153 Cal. 767, 96 P. 804 (1908). California thus takes a properly liberal 
view of the requirements of a sufficient accusatory pleading when such a pleading is 
claimed on collateral attack to have failed to confer jurisdiction on the court. 
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accusatory pleading nor included in any offense that is so 
charged, if he does so pursuant to a plea bargain and the offense 
is reasonably related to defendant's charged conduct." It has 
been held that when an accused pleads not guilty, the court lacks 
jurisdiction to convict him of an uncharged offense, since it has 
failed to give him notice of the possibility of his being so con- 
victed. But one who knowingly enters a plea of guilty to a desig- 
nated offense waives any claim of lack of notice.68 If a defendant 
can enter a valid plea of guilty to an offense not charged, it is 
difficult to see why he cannot plead guilty to an offense that is 
clearly described but not affirmatively shown to be currently pro- 
secutable ?' 
The likeliest explanation for results such as that in Demillo 
is the unthinking invocation of the talismanic term 
"jurisdiction." Characterizing the statute of limitations as 
"jurisdictional" has two immediate results: it establishes that the 
right to rely on the statute was not waived by the entry of a guilty 
67. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 612-13, 477 P.2d 409, 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 396 
(1970). 
68. Id. a t  611-13, 477 P.2d at 419-20, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96. 
69. Of course, the Demillo court did not purport to proceed on the theory that peti- 
tioner's guilty plea was absolutely void because of the information's silence as to the time 
of commission of the offense. It will be recalled that the court responded to the Attorney 
General's offer of proof of limitations-tolling facts by stating that it was not in the business 
of resolving disputed issues of facts, rather than by forthrightly asserting the irrelevancy 
of the factual questions. The court thus assumed that the conviction could be saved, 
regardless of the state of the pleadings, by proof that the prosecution was not in fact barred 
by limitations. 
In the absence of the theory that the defective pleading was fatal to the trial court's 
jurisdiction, the Demillo decision is not explicable on any apparent rational basis. The 
court may have been misled by the statement that "an indictment which when filed shows 
on its face that it is barred by the statute of limitations 'fails to state a public offense' 
. . . ." People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 722, 375 P.2d 839, 845, 25 Cal. Rptr. 847, 853 
(1962). As an abstract matter, this may be true. But an accusatory pleading will almost 
never show affirmatively that it is barred by limitations. It  may show lapse of the prescrip- 
tive period, but it is extremely unlikely to allege facts negating the possibility that the 
statute was tolled during this period. It will thus do no more than suggest the possibility 
of prescription by showing that the date of the commission of the offense was beyond the 
limitations period. It is thus a practical impossibility for an accusatory pleading affirma- 
tively to establish that the prosecution is barred by time. The failure to appreciate this 
fact may afford an explanation for the decision in People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611,36 P.2d 
378 (1934), in which defendant moved to vacate his judgment of conviction on limitations 
grounds. Noting that the accusation showed that the offense had been committed beyond 
the prescriptive period and that it failed to allege tolling facts, the California Supreme 
Court reversed an order denying the motion to vacate. It does not appear that the prosecu- 
tion offered to prove that the statute was tolled, and the court thus did not have to 
determine the effect of such proof. Indeed, for all that appears, the prosecution in McGee 
was time-barred, and the case reached a proper result. 
751 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 95 
plea,70 and permits the validity of a limitations defense to be 
inquired into on habeas corpus.71 But "jurisdiction," particularly 
in California judicial parlance, is a term of great elasticity. In its 
general meaning, it connotes the power of a court to proceed in a 
given action; but in California, "the inability of a court to act 
except in a particular way is 'jurisdictional' as that term is used 
in connection with the prerogative writs."72 The expanded term 
greatly facilitates the use of prerogative writs to review judicial 
actions, since such writs are ostensibly limited to the correction 
of acts in excess of jurisdiction. To characterize a legal question 
as a matter of "jurisdiction," therefore, is merely to say that i t  
can be considered by way of extraordinary writ. The term is thus 
not an aid to analysis but a shorthand expression of a particular 
result. When used as if it were an analytical tool, it frequently 
turns into a substitute for analysis. Demillo apparently began 
with the concept that the statute of limitations is "jurisdictional" 
and concluded from the use of that amorphous term that a failure 
to plead compliance with the statute deprives the court of the 
power to prosecute and punish." 
The proper analytical framework for the formulation of rules 
governing the pleading of the statute of limitations in criminal 
cases requires that attention be directed to underlying policy con- 
siderations not necessarily reflected in such imprecise terms as 
"jurisdiction." As demonstrated earlier, legitimate if question- 
able policy considerations may justify a conclusion that the stat- 
ute of limitations stands as a substantive bar to prosecution and 
punishment, which can be raised at any time. Some rational basis 
can be found for allowing an attack on an otherwise valid judg- 
ment on the basis that the prosecution was in fact barred by 
limitations. No rational basis can be found for allowing a convic- 
tion to be overturned on collateral attack on the sole ground that 
the accusatory pleading failed to allege that the prosecution was 
not barred. 
70. A guilty plea waives only nonjurisdictional defenses. See note 62 supra. 
71. See Granucci, supra note 10, at 192, and cases cited therein. 
72. In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740,750,408 P.2d 948,955,48 Cal. Rptr. 172,179 (1965). 
73. In re Demillo, 14 Cal. 3d at 602, 535 P.2d at 1184, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 728. As noted 
earlier, the court's assertion that the pleading defect itself voids the conviction is incon- 
sistent with its assumption that the conviction could be saved on proof that the statute 
did not in fact run. See note 69 supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The occasional and regrettable failure of the drafters of ac- 
cusatory pleadings to allege facts showing that a prosecution is 
not barred by limitations leaves the courts with the duty to deter- 
mine the consequences of this fai11.11-e." That duty has seldom 
been discharged in accordance with any defensible set of princi- 
ples, and never with any apparent analytical depth. 
It is not difficult to isolate the policy considerations that 
should enter into the development of rules for pleading the stat- 
ute of limitations and to determine the consequences of violating 
these rules. These considerations effectively resolve limitations 
issues and further the discernible policies underlying limitations 
statutes. But these considerations lead to varying results, accord- 
ing to whether the statutes are construed to express a legislative 
intent to provide an accused with a defense benefitting only him- 
self, or to provide an absolute bar to prosecution or punishment 
in the larger interests of society. Either construction is reason- 
able. Both constructions lead to a rule requiring that an accusa- 
tory pleading fully allege facts bearing on limitations. A construc- 
tion of the statute as creating an absolute bar to prosecution or 
punishment supports a rule permitting a defendant to raise for 
the first time on appeal the failure of the pleading to do so. It 
would even permit the question of whether the prosecution was 
in fact barred by time to be litigated on collateral attack. The one 
result that cannot be countenanced under any construction of the 
statutes is the setting aside of a conviction on collateral attack 
on the sole ground of such a pleading defect, without regard to 
whether the statute had actually run. Such a result, a triumph 
of pettifoggery, can only bring the administration of justice into 
public disrepute. 
- - 
74. Even in jurisdictions that do not require the accusation to allege facts showing 
that the prosecution is not barred by limitations, there is nothing to prevent a prosecutor 
from inserting such allegations in the pleading. If in fact a prosecution is not barred by 
limitations, the allegations of facts showing timeliness will prevent the problems consid- 
ered in this article from arising. If the prosecution is barred by time, it should not be 
brought 'in the first place. 
